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Abstract
This article engages with problems that are usually opaque: What trajectories do scientific de-
bates assume, when does a scientific community consider a proposition to be a fact, and how
can we know that? We develop a strategy for evaluating the state of scientific contestation on
issues. The analysis builds from Latour’s black box imagery, which we observe in scientific
citation networks. We show that as consensus forms, the importance of internal divisions to
the overall network structure declines. We consider substantive cases that are now consid-
ered facts, such as the carcinogenicity of smoking and the non-carcinogenicity of coffee.
We then employ the same analysis to currently contested cases: the suspected carcinogenic-
ity of cellular phones, and the relationship between vaccines and autism. Extracting meaning
from the internal structure of scientific knowledge carves a niche for renewed sociological
commentary on science, revealing a typology of trajectories that scientific propositions
may experience en route to consensus.
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When and how did we become certain that
smoking causes cancer, coffee does not,
and human activity is producing global cli-
mate change? Since the coining of scientific
consensus as closure (Pinch and Bijker
1984), various branches of the sociology of
science have made great strides in exposing
its mechanisms (e.g., Collins 2004; Frickel
and Moore 2006; Fujimura 1996; Gieryn
1996; Latour 1987; Shapin 1996; Star and
Griesemer 1989). Yet such studies fall short
of providing a tool to monitor the formation
of closure as consensus among relevant sci-
entists. Existing work in this area is case spe-
cific and limited with respect to comparative
research. As such, it has yet to develop an
analytic typology of possible patterns of con-
sensus formation.
This article offers a quantitative strategy to
measure scientific consensus/contestation lev-
els, which enables comparative research and
thus extends the generalizability of the sociol-
ogy of science. Such a measure may prove
useful to scholars of innovation, and it pro-
vides a new tool for anyone interested in
network structures and their outcomes.
Applying this strategy to several different
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propositions assume on their way through
contestation to consensus among practicing
scientists: (1) spiral, in which substantive
questions are answered and revisited at
a higher level; (2) cyclical, in which similar
questions are revisited without stable closure
(Abbott 2001); and (3) flat, in which there is
no real scientific contestation. This typology
emerges from empirical analysis of controver-
sies and offers terms for rapprochement
between qualitative and quantitative analyses
of science.
Detecting consensus is not trivial, as some
level of contestation is always present in sci-
ence. Scholars dispute previous findings or
point to literature gaps to establish their own
footholds in the field (Bourdieu 1975; Merton
1973). This everyday, normative level of con-
testation is benign, particularly compared with
debates of epistemic rivalry, in which strongly
entrenched camps disagree on core issues.1 In
contexts that harbor extra-scientific interests,
such as the hazards of smoking, interested
groups may exaggerate normative contesta-
tion levels to claim that the extant scientific
knowledge is inconclusive (McCright and
Dunlap 2000; Proctor and Schiebinger
2008). An important contribution of science
and technology studies (STS) is to make
such political manipulation more transparent
and harder to exercise (Oreskes 2004a) by
delivering science to many publics (Collins
and Evans 2002; Latour 2004; Moore 1996)
and delivering lay voices to science (Epstein
1998; Jasanoff 2004; Rowe and Frewer
2005). However, qualitative engagement
with truth, rather than consensus, can only
pass judgment after the fact. A third wave in
the sociology of science seeks ways of assess-
ing science and promoting informed policy
discussions (Collins and Evans 2007; Latour
2009; Weinel 2008). This is the task we
embark on here.
The logic of the strategy we propose is
rooted in Collins’s (1975) ‘‘bottled ships’’
metaphor, which Latour’s conception of black
boxing elaborates: When a proposition is sta-
ble (i.e., a consensual scientific proposition or
a functioning machine), its internal elements
are concealed. While a proposition is in the
making and still contested, however, the inter-
actions between its internal elements are visi-
ble. We export this insight to the macro-
structure of scientific citation networks and
employ a network community-detection algo-
rithm (Leicht and Newman 2008) to evaluate
the degree of internal divisions in scientific
literatures. The analysis allows us to distin-
guish epistemic rivalries from benign contes-
tation: When different factions debate
a scientific issue, they create distinct regions
in a citation network. In epistemic rivalries,
such network regions are a defining character-
istic of a network’s structure. When consensus
over an issue emerges (and only benign con-
testation remains), the salience of these re-
gions to the overall network structure
diminishes. To account for temporality, we
develop a novel approach to answer Picker-
ing’s (1993) critique that quantitative analyses
are inherently ex-post in their relation to sci-
ence. We unfold the emergent temporality of
scientific debates by identifying a new prop-
erty of such disputes: the relevant temporal
length of scholarly interaction. By capturing
the temporality of consensus formation, we
discover that scientific literatures can follow
three trajectories—spiral, cyclical, or flat.
We apply our analysis strategy to four
cases in which experts’ reports identify the
timing of consensus accomplishment: the
carcinogenicity of smoking, solar radiation,
and coffee, as well as anthropogenic climate
change.2 A fifth validating case is the con-
troversy regarding gravitational waves,
which Harry Collins (e.g., 2004) studied
extensively. Our analysis reveals consensus
earlier than do expert evaluations. Having
validated our measure compared with exist-
ing authoritative mechanisms, we then apply
the method to two additional cases of cur-
rent relevance: Do cellular phones cause
cancer, and do vaccinations cause autism?
We find that there is no real contestation
within the scientific community about these
questions.
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EXISTING LITERATURE
Studying scientific consensus and closure is
a major focus of recent work in the sociology
of science. Different streams within the soci-
ology of science expose how scientific con-
sensus is not a direct consequence of new
findings but is shaped by extra-scientific fac-
tors such as culture (Hess 1995), power and
funding (Martin and Richards 1995), politics
(Epstein 1998), and personal credibility
(Leahey 2005; Shapin 1994). In addition,
consensus results from social processes
within the core set of practicing scientists
who negotiate results (Collins 1974, 1992,
2004), demarcate knowledge claims (Gieryn
1999; Wynne 1996), construct boundary ob-
jects to conceal conflict (Star and Griesemer
1989), employ micro-politics of translation
(Latour 1987), and fortify bandwagon practi-
ces (Fujimura 1996). A next step is to
develop a strategy that allows for easy com-
parison across cases.
Generally speaking, scholars identify con-
sensus by immersing themselves in a cognitive
scientific domain and then report their conclu-
sions on the status of the field. Studies of sci-
entific consensus thus leave its detection
entirely in the hands of experts, be they practi-
tioners of the issue under scrutiny or expert so-
ciologists of science. Oreskes’s (2004b) report
of consensus on climate change offers one
influential example. However, when deep
understanding of each case is required merely
to assess its consensus level, comparative
research that sorts and qualifies the plethora
of consensus forming mechanisms becomes
difficult. The sociology of expertise suggests
moving beyond expert filtration of knowledge
by developing general rules to assess different
expert claims (Collins and Evans 2007; Wei-
nel 2008). In this article, we provide such
a strategy using scientific products as data.
Sociologists of science used to quantify
consensus either by asking practitioners about
it (Biglan 1973; Hargens and Kellywilson
1994), by journal rejection rates (Hargens
1988; Hargens and Kellywilson 1994), by
(inverse) lengths of published abstracts, by
cohesiveness of graduate training (Ashar and
Shapiro 1990), or by agreement between dif-
ferent reviewers of grant proposals (Cole
1983). These studies examine consensus lev-
els in disciplines. Disciplines, however, are
not the arenas of scientific progress (Cole
1983; Kuhn 1970). While detecting consensus
in disciplines answers an interesting question,
it is not the central concern here. Science ad-
vances around sub- and multi-disciplinary
puzzles, as evident by the breadth of contrib-
utors to the report of the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 2007).
Quantitative attempts at measuring scien-
tific consensus on issues, rather than disci-
plines, are rare (Cole and Zuckerman 1975).
Following their lead, Evans (2007a) recently
analyzed discursive-consensus formation on
subdebates (which might proxy the substan-
tive consensus we investigate). Overall, how-
ever, Cole and Zukerman’s effort ended
prematurely (Wray 2005). Before finding
a meaningful measure of scientific consensus,
sociologists stopped searching.
This abandonment of the search for a con-
sensus measure followed the emergence of the
sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK),
which diverted attention from classic, Merto-
nian sociology of science (Zuckerman 1988).
SSK mastered a qualitative gaze into scientific
knowledge. Classic sociologists of science
sought a consensus measure because they
were reluctant to engage with scientific con-
tent. SSK and later scholars abandoned the
search for a consensus measure because they
had no reason to short circuit their engage-
ment with domain knowledge. In doing so,
SSK gave up on the manipulation of scale
that makes comparative studies important
and influential.
Recent works from organizational theory
and social movement research offer a system-
atic examination of the dynamics of scientific
claims and fields, as well as their effects on
society (see Frickel and Gross 2005; Frickel
and Moore 2006; Owen-Smith and Powell
2008). Such studies abandon the distinction
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between external and internal influences on
science, revealing both as crucial. Science op-
erates in a co-constitutive environment of or-
ganizations and networks that is shaped by
social, technical, and economic changes (Po-
well et al. 2005; Smith-Doerr, Manev, and Ri-
zova 2004), as well as by funding (Evans
2007b; Hess 2006), geographical embedded-
ness (Whittington, Owen-Smith, and Powell
2009), and a host of micro strategies (Powell
and Colyvas 2008). Therefore, this tradition
may benefit from our conceptualization of
consensus.
In this article, we supplement such investi-
gations of ‘‘why we know’’ with a compara-
tive framework to examine ‘‘when we
know.’’ We show that it is possible to time
consensus and to compare it across cases
without demanding domain expertise of the
analyst. The focus on timing opens new ques-
tions for organizational theory and the sociol-
ogy of science. For science, the simplest of
these—and perhaps the most important—is
what do the trajectories of scientific proposi-
tions look like?
BLACK BOXING FACTS
How do we know when something is a fact?
Oreskes (2004b) asserts that science should
be evaluated by its inscriptions—that is,
when an entire scientific literature agrees
on something, we can treat it as a fact. Mak-
ing such a claim requires domain-specific
expertise. This demand hinders comparative
research and introduces potential biases.
Oreskes, for example, codes climate change
publications into groups characterized as
supportive, skeptical, and indifferent. It is
not surprising that skeptics challenged her
selection and coding schemes. By identifying
a structural measure of consensus, we mini-
mize experts’ discretion. Actor Network The-
ory (ANT) shares this goal.
Our theoretical model can be traced back
to Collins’s (1974) idea that facts are like
ships in bottles and we should study these
ships/facts as they are being built; that is, as
a core set of practicing scientists transform
several possible answers to a question into
one correct and several erroneous answers
(Collins 2004), where correct and erroneous
reflect only an agreement in the scientific
community at a given time, not some tran-
scendental truth. Latour (1999) elaborated
this notion into the broad ANT concept of
black boxing and detailed what we may find
in its formation process: A black box is an
apparatus that conceals its internal elements,
which are viewed only through inputs and out-
puts (Latour 1987, 1999). A working com-
puter is a black box with a keyboard (for
inputs) and a screen (for output). Only when
the computer malfunctions, or as it is assem-
bled, can we see that it is really a network,
tying together chips, magnets, service pro-
viders, and so on. Similarly, the proposition
‘‘smoking causes cancer,’’ stated today, needs
no proof; it works and is tied into a vast net-
work of persons, substances, studies, and pol-
icies. The entire epoch (of statistical
inference, tragic deaths, chemical processes,
and genetics) that once showed that smoking
causes cancer is concealed. Its elaboration is
no longer required because the proposition is
connected to every cigarette carton and life
insurance application. Its internal elements
(e.g., chemicals and statistics) already work
together, so their connections do not require
explication. Consensus formation is a black-
boxing process: the weaving together of mul-
tiple elements of scientific propositions until
their internal divisions are well hidden.
We can observe black boxing in citation
networks, or more precisely, in representa-
tions of scientific papers connected by cita-
tions. Empirical and theoretical work
suggests that citations most often signal agree-
ment.3 This probabilistic property induces
identifiable areas in the citation network
characterized by denser interactions—what
can be identified as network communities—
even when one is blind to citation type (e.g.,
favorable, opposing, or ceremonial). Conse-
quently, the network structure that emerges
from citation networks of contentious
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literatures is characterized by relatively segre-
gated communities. Of course, communities
are not completely segregated, as not all cita-
tions are favorable. Yet both Merton’s and La-
tour’s theories, as well as Hanney and
colleagues’ (2005) findings, suggest that con-
tentious literatures should exhibit a salient
community structure. It follows that the
salience of communities to a network’s typol-
ogy is measurable; a reduction in community
salience of citation networks over time should
point to consensus formation in the literature.
In this article, our empirical task is to con-
sider this proposition. After empirically show-
ing that community salience measures
consensus, we can identify patterns of consen-
sus formation. The many insights on micro
processes of consensus formation reviewed
earlier provide little help for identifying the
macro patterns of its formation over time.
Mulkay, Gilbert, and Woolgar (1975) argue
that there are three stages in the lives of prob-
lem areas: exploration, in which unconnected
scientists explore a new problem indepen-
dently; followed by unification, in which the
explorers become the leaders of a unified,
exponentially growing field; and finally
decline/displacement, caused by the institu-
tionalization of the field, which restricts new
discovery. In passing, Mulkay and colleagues
argue that the unification stage may lead to
a redefinition of the field, rather than to its
decline or displacement. Our findings show
that in Khunian normal science controversies,
such as the carcinogenicity of solar radiation,
Mulkay and colleagues’ model fits well. We
call this a spiral pattern, in which many new
questions pop up following the unification
stage. A different pattern is evident for public
controversies that are not really controversial
among scientists, such as the carcinogenicity
of coffee or the debate over autism and vac-
cines. We call these controversies flat because
they exhibit the same exponential growth of
papers but with flat (and low) contestation
levels. Finally, scientific controversies such
as the carcinogenicity of tobacco exhibit the
redefinition of the field mentioned by Mulkay
and colleagues in passing. We call these con-
troversies cyclical because they reveal how
consensus forms, is destroyed, and is rebuilt




The strategy we develop in this article di-
verges from previous work by focusing on
papers without disciplinary boundaries.
Most previous studies that attempt to mea-
sure consensus deal with whole disciplines,
and the few exceptions focus on a qualitative
selection of a core set of scientists (i.e., au-
thors) that compose a sub-disciplinarian cog-
nitive domain (e.g., Cole and Zuckerman
1975; Collins 1974). By using papers as our
focal units (see elaboration below and in
the online supplement [http://asr.sagepub
.com/supplemental]), we avoid reducing
pieces of knowledge into their authors’
dynamics or institutions4 as we observe
how the products of science—peer-reviewed
papers—obtain verisimilitude (Latour 1999)
and become building blocks of a single prop-
osition. Measures focusing on author degree
or expert opinions are problematic because
they select on authors, leading to loss of
important information. If, for example, a cru-
cial step in the black boxing of ‘‘smoking
causes cancer’’ was a statistical innovation,
simply following cancer scholars would
never reveal it.
Although it seems anti-intuitive, brief
reflection indicates that when all papers about
a subject are black-boxed together, their net-
work structure is not defined by the presence
of disjoint communities. When papers pro-
mote the same views5 and cite the same sour-
ces, the science behind them is conclusive. It
may turn out that this science was wrong, or
that published consensus was a result of fiat,
but regardless of the reasons behind consen-
sus, the community structure of research liter-
atures’ citation networks can reveal if the
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scientific questions that produced them are
black boxed or contentious. Approaching the
problem from this perspective allows us to
develop a strategy for observing consensus
formation in scientific literatures, without reli-
ance on mediating experts’ interpretations.
METHODS
Since Price (1965) suggested that the degree
distribution of citations could point to impor-
tant papers and journals, network analysis
has become prominent in evaluating jour-
nals’ importance (Garfield 1972) and induc-
ing mappings of science (Moody 2004).
Generally speaking, the strategies reflected
in the network literature on citations take
for granted predetermined categories (e.g.,
disciplines or journals) and restrict analysis
to a predetermined subset of the literature.
This is unfortunate.
As Figure 1 shows, citation networks are
too complex to reveal anything by simple
observation. The tools scholars have used
to extract meaning from such graphs
demand reduction and simplification, for
example by removing infrequently cited pa-
pers (Small 2006) or predetermining the
sample of authors (Collins 2004). Such
automatic deletion distorts network meas-
ures and gives citation indexes a critical
level of importance. This assumption is not
self-evident. If, for example, all papers cit-
ing a specific paper in a network were never
cited themselves, deleting them would hide
this important finding. Our strategy also in-
volves data reduction, but one that is data
driven and analytic. We model the internal
structure of citation networks to reveal con-
sensus without classifying papers or authors
into membership of different camps. Our
measure enables agnosticism toward papers’
content because we extract meaning—that
is, the contestation level of scientific
debates—from the structure of the networks
indexed by their organic community
structure.
Modularity as a Measure of
Scientific Consensus
In network terms, a community is a subset of
a larger population where internal ties are
more prevalent than ties to other subsets. In
a network of asphalt roads, for example,
communities are villages, cities, and states.
In a network of scientific papers linked by ci-
tations, communities are groups of papers
that deal with the same issues and cite each
other. Papers that agree are likely to cite
each other much more than their protagonists
(Hanney et al. 2005), giving rise to commu-
nities of agreement. The simple intuition
underlying our strategy is that when different
communities are salient to the global struc-
ture, the field is contentious.
It follows that changes in a citation net-
work’s community structure represent
changes in consensus levels on an issue: Con-
tentious networks are well defined by commu-
nities, and consensual networks are not.
Consensus formation exhibits a decline in
community salience; the literature produces
a common, core community and many minis-
cule communities (e.g., in the case of smoking
and cancer, miniscule communities are popu-
lated by studies that retain smoking as a con-
trol variable when studying, say, the hazards
of solar radiation). A consensual literature
set is black boxed, and its internal divisions
carry little structural meaning. Statistically,
we measure this as the amount of information
that communities carry regarding a network’s
structure. In the current context, as a domain
gains consensus, its citation network’s com-
munity salience declines.6
What does community salience mean, and
how does one find communities? Different
methods are suitable for different cases
(Reichardt 2009). Recently, Newman (2006)
introduced a method for partitioning a network
into communities by maximizing modularity.
For a given network division, modularity
compares the odds of within-community ties
with these odds after a random rewiring of
the network. If a division does not include
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more within-community ties than it would
with random ties, it is an artifact of
individual-level properties (i.e., degree distri-
bution) and harbors no further information
about the structure. The division’s modularity
in such a case is 0. Modularity, then, measures
the salience of communities for a given divi-
sion. Maximizing this property is one way to
get a division.
Our focus is on the dynamics of commu-
nity salience, so the partition that maximizes
this property is appropriate for our purposes.
Figure 2 presents some simple networks and
their modularity scores and shows how mean-
ingful internal groupings—groupings that are
not defined by a node’s properties—increase
modularity.
Modularity maximization algorithms iden-
tify an important network property: the
maximal amount of information that groups
carry about a network. We argue that maximal
modularity—that is, modularity of the divi-
sion obtained by modularity maximization
—indexes community salience. If no partition
of a network reveals much about it, communi-
ties are not salient. Black boxing suggests that
community salience—the importance of com-
munities to the macro structure—is highest
when a proposition is combating objection
and lowest when it is consensual fact. When
consensus on an issue arises and contestation
levels decrease, modularity scores decrease
too—which is what we observe. The contesta-
tion we wish to reveal, however, is histori-
cally-specific epistemic rivalries. Modularity
does not distinguish between these and benign
contestation. The course of professionaliza-
tion in science, regardless of consensus, also
Figure 1. Citation Network of 4,276 Papers about Smoking and Cancer, 1920 to 1995
Note: The outside ring is populated by 906 isolated papers that do not cite other papers and were not
cited by 1995. Most of the network is connected in a large crowded component. Different graphic algo-
rithms may draw this network differently, but it remains hard to extract meaning from such
representations.
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creates salient network communities that
modularity detects. Such benign contestation
is a product of network size and reflects scien-
tists’ struggles to establish their own niches in
growing literatures. To discuss epistemic
rivalries, we therefore scale raw modularity
scores with a literature’s size (see the online
supplement).
DATA
So far, we have outlined a theoretical concept
for thinking about consensus and a way to
express it quantitatively. To show that our
concept actually measures consensus, we
consider five different cases and compare
them with expert reports made in real time.
Two of the cases we selected because they
pertain to scientific issues that were once
contentious but became consensual: smoking
and cancer, and anthropogenic climate
change. We supplement these with two cases
that were historically less contentious—the
carcinogenicity of solar radiation and coffee
(this was a case of consensus on a null find-
ing, as the scientific community quickly
exonerated coffee from suspicions of carci-
nogenicity). Our fifth case provides an iconic
example: the claim of gravitational waves,
which has had an impressive history in
SSK. These five cases validate our strategy
across different periods, contexts, and scales.
We then apply our strategy to the literatures
about the possible carcinogenicity of cellular
phones and the possible relationship between
vaccinations and autism, both of which lack
an authoritative expert report. This analysis
suggests that scientists agree that vaccina-
tions do not cause autism and that there is
consensus on the inconclusiveness of science
on cellular radiation. Media reports of these
issues overrepresent minority views (Boykoff
and Boykoff 2004).
Using keywords, we define our cases by
their cognitive domain rather than select on
authors. For each case, we use specific
Figure 2. Modularity of Five Artificial Networks of Eight Nodes
Note:Modularity is 0 for the two cases in the top panel. While the networks are very different, they have
in common the fact that ties are completely dependent on individual properties. In the top panel, random
rewiring would only reproduce the same network, and thus communities contribute no information
about the network structure. When all ties in a network are within communities, as in the bottom-left
network, modularity is high—random rewiring would allocate half of the ties in this case between com-
munities, and the original state has all of them within communities, so modularity is .5. As more
between-community ties are introduced in the original state (in the two remaining examples) modularity
declines.
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keywords that define a cognitive domain to
extract a comprehensive set of all papers in-
dexed by ISI Web of Science. We selected
keywords with the aim of including every rel-
evant paper. For example, the keywords used
to construct the ‘‘smoking and cancer’’ dataset
are (Smoking OR nicotine OR cigar* OR
Tobacco) AND (cancer OR carci*).7 Any
paper about cancer and smoking is included.
We limit the data to articles and reviews,
forming a comprehensive set of peer-reviewed
scientific works on a subject. Table 1 presents
general properties of these datasets.
As noted earlier, defining a cognitive
domain by sampling core-set authors (e.g.,
Cole and Zukerman 1975; Collins 2004) or
a broader set of contributing scientists (Wei-
nel 2008) may omit important parts of the
domain. Our approach, on the other hand, is
exposed to the danger of being over inclusive.
Selecting only on keywords, we let in some
irrelevant papers (e.g., Wallace [1994] dis-
cusses carcinogenicity risk evaluation in pesti-
cides, noting in the abstract that it is
insignificant compared with tobacco). Our
sense is that inclusion is superior to the risk
of exclusion because our method is robust to
noise. Theoretically, no other criteria can
define a cognitive domain with more accuracy
than the terms used by the papers (indeed,
Wallace’s paper takes for granted tobacco’s
carcinogenicity, maintaining the consensus).
If a paper is irrelevant, it will not connect to
other relevant papers and will have no effect
on the modularity score. Our approach is not
immune to deliberate manipulation (e.g., con-
structing a literature with the keywords
‘‘baby’’ and ‘‘murder’’ and reporting it as
a set about abortions), but no data collection
method is. Our approach, however, is easy
to assess through evaluation of keywords. Fur-
thermore, a sensitivity analysis shows that
(honest) changes in keyword selection do
not change the results (see the online
supplement).
Using Garfield’s HistCite software, we
generated a graph representation of the data
and further modified it in R (Csardi and
Nepusz 2006; R Development Core Team
2008) to account for temporality, as described
below. We then evaluated the salience of
community structure over time using the
Leicht and Newman (2008) algorithm, which
adds directionality to Newman’s (2006)
algorithm.
MODELING TIME
Our effort is inherently historical; we try to
answer Pickering’s (1993) call to understand
science in its temporal unfolding. We seek
the critical years in which, and the dynamic
patterns by which, propositions were black
boxed from contentious to consensual litera-
tures. Our modeling of time is critical; we
need to be sensitive to new developments
without neglecting old papers that remain rel-
evant. Our method relies on published pa-
pers, which produces a latency period from
the moment a discovery is made to its journal
publication.
How can we define scientific knowledge at
a given moment? Observing only the latest
research severs ties to old papers, while
observing all previous research greatly ex-
tends the latency period. Common strategies
are a cumulative approach (e.g., Leicht et
al. 2007), a cross-sectional method (e.g.,
Cole and Zuckerman 1975), or a moving
window strategy (e.g., Small 2006) that
uses sliding, fixed-width observation win-
dows. The latter two methods ignore cita-
tions to older papers and require an analyst
to predetermine either discrete periods or
a uniform observation width. By predeter-
mining these properties, an analyst imposes
an ex-post view of the field (Pickering
1993). Moreover, these strategies ignore
the fact that some papers are more reachable
than others, and that this difference in acces-
sibility is itself time variant (Evans 2008).
To properly account for temporal unfolding,
we need a mechanism to model window
width for each point in time.
A meaningful observation period improves
the moving window approach by determining



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































window width from the changing structure of
citations. We call this the dynamic window
approach. For each year Y, we note a distribu-
tion of citation-ages, defined as the difference
between Y and the year of publication of each
paper cited in Y. The median of this distribu-
tion serves as window width for year Y.8 We
then define every paper published within the
width years from Y as a focal paper, relevant
for the year at the end of the window. We
include older papers that are still cited by
any focal paper to keep influential papers in
our analysis, regardless of their age; we do
not include the papers cited by these older pa-
pers. For example, of all citations made in pa-
pers about smoking hazards published in
1987, the median citation-age is 4. The
dynamic network for 1987, then, contains all
papers published from 1984 to 1987, and all
the papers they cited, regardless of year.
This procedure is superior to cross-sectional
and fixed-width window approaches because
its observation window is theoretically justi-
fied and sensitive to the varying time frames
of scientific activity.
To demonstrate the advantage of dynamic
windows over the cumulative approach, we
mimic Leicht and colleagues (2007). They
calculated authority scores9 for each court rul-
ing (paper), pointing to its importance in the
network (Kleinberg 1999), and plotted the
mean age of top authorities over time. For
each year Y, we calculate the mean difference
between Y and the publication years of the top
15 authorities, derived from the cumulative
network and from our dynamic approach. In
years that the set of top authorities is
unchanged, mean age increases by one. A
smaller increase, or a decline, signifies that
new papers became authoritative. If the
mean age rises by more than one, older papers
that were not authoritative are rediscovered as
such.
Figure 3 displays this analysis for cumula-
tive and dynamic windows in two cases—the
carcinogenicity of tobacco and coffee. In the
top panels, triangles represent the cumulative
approach, and circles represent our dynamic
windows. The Y-axis reports mean age of
the set of top authorities. The bottom panels
simply show the slopes of the top panels, to
highlight changes. Dark bars signal the cumu-
lative approach, and clear bars represent
dynamic windows. In both cases, the cumula-
tive networks (represented by triangles) reveal
early lock-in on a set of authorities.10
Relying on cumulative networks, one
would conclude that no major shifts occurred
in the research on coffee and cancer since
1984, and in research on smoking and cancer
since 1953. The latter, of course, is false.
Dynamic window networks, represented by
circles and empty bars, tell a different story:
These networks reveal critical points in which
the set of top authorities as discussed in a spe-
cific year change. With respect to smoking,
dynamic windows show an exuberant litera-
ture, evident by the changing slopes in the
empty bars. Here we see that the set of top
authorities was stable in only 3 of 53 years.
This is not an artifact of the modeling struc-
ture. In sluggish literatures, like the carcinoge-
nicity of coffee, the dynamic windows
approach reports similar results to the cumula-
tive approach. Our modeling also produces
a relevant variable for future studies—the
real-time meaningful observation period—and
thus answers the critique that quantitative
analyses of science are inherently ex-post.
They need not be.
RESULTS
We test whether scientific consensus forma-
tion is observable as a reduction in the com-
munity salience of propositions’ citation
networks, measured by the network modular-
ity score, scaled for size. When communities
are no longer a defining characteristic of
a citation network, the network works
together as a black box (compared to a past
state of contestation). To examine this idea,
we present scaled modularity dynamics of
five sets of scientific literatures, comparing
modularity drops to expert reports11 for
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calibration. We use monographs of the Inter-
national Agency for Research on Cancer
(IARC), an agency of the World Health
Organization, as indicators of scientific con-
sensus regarding suspected carcinogens.12
Likewise, the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC) supplies a consensus
indicator regarding climate change. For con-
troversies surrounding gravitational waves,
we rely on Collins’s (2004) extensive analy-
sis of the field.
We start with a simple case to illustrate the
analysis framework: the proposition, rejected
by experts, that coffee causes cancer. This
issue was never really contested, and we
expect modularity to be low throughout the
proposition’s history. The other cases examine
modularity trends vis-a`-vis experts’ consensus
Figure 3. Top 15 Authorities across Time: Cumulative and Dynamic Time Frames
Note: The top panels plot the mean age of the top-15 ranking papers on Kleinberg (1999) authority
scores. Triangles represent the cumulative approach, and circles represent dynamic windows. The bot-
tom panels show the slopes of the top figures, with shaded bars for cumulative networks and empty
bars for windowed networks. When the top authorities are fixed, each passing year increases their
mean age by one year, and the slope is one. A naive cumulative conception of passing time produces
the appearance of lock-in on leaders once a network is larger than the set size (15). Dynamic moving
windows that capture papers relevant to a specific period (represented by circles and empty slope
bars) reveal the difference between the cases. The literature on smoking and cancer shows many turn-
ing points, likely reversing significant contestation. The research on coffee and cancer is stable over
time, maintaining its consensus.
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declarations: carcinogenicity of solar radia-
tion (IARC 1992), gravitational waves
(Collins 2004), tobacco’s carcinogenicity
(IARC 1986; U.S. Surgeon General 1964),
and anthropogenic climate change (IPCC
2007). Figure 4 presents modularity analy-
ses, noting the timing of experts’ consensus
declarations vis-a`-vis our analysis.
Note that modularity trends are driven nei-
ther by time (or any time-dependent process,
such as online archiving) nor by the number
of papers in a window (N).13 This is evident
in the simple case of coffee and cancer.
Coffee is not cancerous; this was never hotly
debated. We thus expect the figure to show
a flat pattern of consensus formation.
The solid line in Panel A presents modular-
ity scores for the coffee and cancer literature
with the number of papers represented by
the dashed line. Except for a steep decline
between 1984 and 1987, as the literature
grew to more than 30 papers, the trend is sta-
ble and hovers around .1, even as the number
of papers increases. In 1991, the IARC
lumped coffee with several other drinks,
announcing they are not carcinogenic (IARC
Figure 4. Epistemic Rivalry, Size, and Expert Reports in Five Validating Cases
Note: The dashed line refers to the number of papers in the dynamic window and to the logarithmic
right-hand-side-axis. The solid line refers to the level of epistemic rivalry, estimated as the modularity
score scaled for logged network size, on the left-hand-side-axis. The bars show years in which critical
expert committees published a consensus report, or, in panel C, the years Collins identifies as marking
the end of controversy and the emergence of consensus.
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1991). The trend and level show no epistemic
rivalry since 1985 and are driven by neither
time nor N.
Panel B considers the proposition that solar
radiation causes cancer. At the outset, this
case seems to represent normal science—
scholars find that the sun causes cancer and
then disseminate that knowledge. We expect
modularity trends to follow what we call a
spiral—some initial epistemic rivalry is
quickly resolved, and scholars then move to
secondary questions. This leads to increasing
numbers of papers linked to a common core,
keeping modularity low. The history of skin
cancer research confirms this interpretation.
In the early 1980s, this literature was conten-
tious and its network structure was well
defined by communities, with scaled modular-
ity fluctuating around .15 with a peak of .19
in 1985. Subsequently, modularity dropped,
following a large-scale study relating mela-
noma to sun exposure (Elwood et al. 1985).
By 1992, scaled modularity levels dropped
to .1. We view such a significant decline
over several years as consensus formation.
That year, the IARC published its first
report on solar radiation, stating sufficient
evidence for carcinogenicity. In 1997, the
IARC updated its report with evidence of
carcinogenicity of tanning lamps. Note that
marked drops in modularity preceded both
expert reports.
The case of gravitational waves further val-
idates modularity as a consensus index. Schol-
ars of gravitational waves debate whether and
which of their observation tools may detect
the waves of gravitational energy emitted
from distant astronomical events. This case,
recorded by Collins (2004), allows one to
track periods of relative consensus or contes-
tation. Our analysis shows (see Panel C) that
the history of gravitational waves had three
periods of declining epistemic rivalry, in
which consensus was formed: 1966 to 1969,
1970 to 1976, and 1992 to 1997, each marked
by a steep and consistent decrease in modular-
ity scores. The earlier periods are followed by
a significant rise in scaled modularity,
signaling contestation, while the consensus
obtained in the last period is maintained.
According to Collins (2004), the field
underwent three major shifts: from attempts
to measure gravitational waves with metal
bars, to the use of cryogenic devices, and
finally to expensive interferometers. Panel C
maps well to these shifts. The first period14
of decreasing modularity (from .14 in 1966
to .12 in 1969) corresponds to the first experi-
ments conducted by Joseph Weber, which
consolidated the field of experimental gravita-
tional waves. The reaction to Weber’s papers
instigated the controversy that occupied Col-
lins’s early publications on the field and is
apparent in the increase of scaled modularity
from 1969 to 1971 (to .16). Collins (2004)
argued recently that this closure was clear
by 1975, although he did not know it in real
time. Our approach suggests that contestation
decreased after 1971 and reached its local low
(.1) by 1976. Collins (2004) calls the follow-
ing period (late 1970s to late 1990s) ‘‘the
bar wars’’—a dispute over the use of cryo-
genic bars versus interferometers. Scaled
modularity fluctuates between .1 and .12 in
that period. Collins (2004) does not clearly
state when this debate ended, although he
points to the National Science Foundation
review of 1996. We observe closure signs as
early as 1992, when modularity declined and
reached below .1 in 1995. Across the board,
our analysis of changing contestation levels
is consistent with Collins’s narrative.
Questions of smoking and climate change
(see Panels D and E) are intrinsically more
interesting because while experts today
believe these propositions are true, they used
to be very contested and were riddled with
claims of inconclusive science (McCright
and Dunlap 2000; Samet and Burke 2001).
These cases are central to the concept of agno-
tology—that is, industries’ deliberate hin-
drance of science (Proctor and Schiebinger
2008). Absent structural analysis, timing con-
sensus formation on the hazards of smoking
would likely point to 1964 and the first Sur-
geon General report, or 1986, when three
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major reports were published by the IARC
(1986), Surgeon General Koop (USDHHS
1986), and the National Academy of Sciences
(NAS) (1986). Timing climate change consen-
sus, one would likely point to the IPCC’s
(2007) fourth report or Oreskes’s (2004b)
paper that surveyed all relevant abstracts.
Our approach identifies consensus earlier,
refuting claims of inconclusive science and
revealing that the cases are different.
Panel D presents analysis of the proposi-
tion that smoking causes cancer. This is the
iconic cyclical case. Despite huge research ef-
forts, consensus was hard to form. Early
claims of carcinogenicity (e.g., Wynder, Gra-
ham, and Croninger 1953) spiked fierce
debate; scaled modularity rose to .13 by
1958, only to drop to .08 by 1964. Looking
at modularity trends, one could identify con-
sensus as early as 1961 based on the continu-
ous decline. Indeed, in 1962 the Royal
Academy of Physicians declared that tobacco
is carcinogenic, and in two years the U.S. Sur-
geon General (1964) joined this assessment.
Following the Surgeon General’s report, con-
sensus was shattered. Modularity ascended
from 1965 through the early 1980s and re-
mained high even as it fluctuated. Here we
can observe a combative literature, with
research funded in part by the public and in
part by tobacco companies. Historical ac-
counts describe the period as a series of battles
(Brandt 1998), which inspires our metaphor of
a cyclical pattern. The question of tobacco’s
carcinogenicity was answered and reopened
in different formulations, such as the possibil-
ity of safe cigarettes and the role of nicotine.
Historians argue that the Koop (USDHHS
1986) and the NAS (1986) reports resolved
the conflict, showing that smoking kills non-
smokers. Starting in 1981 (when the first
study to show the hazards of secondhand
smoke was published), scaled modularity
began to sharply drop, from .15 to .12 in
1985. Kabat (2008) describes how hazards
of secondhand smoke remained controversial
after the 1986 report, creating the need for
the 1992 EPA report. By then, scaled
modularity was at .1. As with gravitational
waves, modularity analysis conveys the gen-
eral pattern of historians’ account but identi-
fies nascent consensus somewhat earlier.
The climate change case (see Panel E) re-
veals that scientific contestation was evident
only until the early 1990s. While the public
representation of this debate suggests it is sim-
ilar to the tobacco case, Oreskes (2004b)
shows that the scientific community reached
consensus as early as 1993. We can observe
earlier dynamics: Between 1986 and 1990,
scaled modularity was relatively high, show-
ing a significant, stable, but not ultimate
decline toward 1992. IPCC’s (1992) early
report states consensus on climate change
but not on its anthropogenic causes, which is
not stated until the IPCC’s (1995) second
report, at which point scaled modularity drops
below .1, echoed in 2001 and 2007. Our re-
sults reject the claim of inconclusive science
on climate change and identify the emergence
of consensus earlier than previously thought.
Given the weight of this case in illustrations
of political interventions in science, it is note-
worthy that its scientific representation,
derived solely from peer-reviewed articles, re-
sembles the spiral pattern of cases like skin
cancer far more than cyclical cases such as
the hazards of smoking.
Two Currently Contested Cases
The patterns reported in Figure 4 support the
idea that the community salience of scientific
citation networks describes their epistemic
rivalries. To validate the approach, we com-
pared it with traditional ways of declaring
consensus. Having validated it, we can now
use our method to describe cases that still
seem contested. Figure 5 presents analysis
for the propositions that mobile phones’ radi-
ation is cancerous (Panel A) and that vacci-
nations cause autism (Panel B).
With respect to the proposition that cell
phones cause cancer, Panel A shows relatively
high scaled modularity of .15 in 1997. Since
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then, the literature is characterized by a fairly
steady decrease in scaled modularity, reaching
.09 in 2004 and decreasing since. Recall that
our strategy measures consensus but does
not point to its substance. For that, we exam-
ine abstracts of influential papers. By 2004,
most authorities found no significant cancer-
ous effects of mobile phones (e.g., Wakeford
2004). This particular literature is remarkably
cordial; the few studies that find effects admit
their methodological problems, while the
majority that do not find effects argue that
more research is needed. Neither side conclu-
sively argues that the issue is proven. Our re-
sults suggest that this case has been
consensual since 2002. The prevailing repre-
sentation in the field, exemplified by the com-
prehensive INTERPHONE study (Cardis et al.
2010), is that the science remains inconclu-
sive. Yet, in opposition to some media repre-
sentations of the subject that portray this
inconclusiveness as an epistemic rivalry (e.g.,
Figure 5. Epistemic Rivalries and Literatures’ Size in Two Publicly Contested Cases
Note: The dashed line refers to the number of papers in the dynamic window and to the logarithmic
right-hand-side-axis. The solid line refers to the level of epistemic rivalry, estimated as the modularity
score scaled for logged network size, on the left-hand-side-axis. Scaled modularity levels in the debate
regarding the carcinogenicity of cellular phones decrease until 2004 from .15 to .09 and are more stable
since. The scientific discussion of vaccinations as a cause of autism was never contested, as scaled mod-
ularity levels are very low, between .06 and .07 throughout the research period.
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Ketcham 2010), our analysis indicates that the
scientific consensus is that no proof for cellu-
lar radiation hazards has been identified. The
contestation tapped by journalists is entirely
benign contestation, while the scientists who
find no hazards of cellular radiation argue
themselves that more research is needed.
Turning to Panel B where we consider the
risk of autism posed by the triple vaccination
for Measles, Mumps, and Rubella (MMR), it
is evident that the scientific community has
consensus refuting the relationship. Yet anec-
dotal information from parents of children
with autism generates strong sentiment in
many lay communities that vaccines are caus-
ally related to autism. In the case of cellular
phones, doubt about the scientific consensus,
or belief that it may soon change, may lead in-
dividuals to stop using them with few implica-
tions aside from one’s social life. In the case
of MMR vaccinations and autism, however,
doubts about the scientific consensus lead in-
dividuals to withdraw from vaccinations, risk-
ing the loss of herd immunity for diseases
once largely eradicated from the developing
world (Glanz et al. 2009; Jansen et al. 2003;
Salathe and Bonhoeffer 2008; Smith et al.
2008). As with other contested issues that
are not really contested—for example, the
effectiveness of abstinence pledges and
DARE programs—identifying when science
has got the story right may have important
policy implications.
DISCUSSION
This article provides a new way of measuring
scientific consensus. We suggested that con-
sensus formation is a form of black boxing,
traceable as a decline in the community
salience of citation networks. Along the
way, we developed a new approach to tem-
porality in citation networks. Measuring
community salience as modularity, we distin-
guish between the component of community
salience created by normal fragmentation and
specialization, which we name benign
contestation, and the epistemic rivalries that
are the substance of severe contestation and
around which consensus forms. The former
is a product of the literatures’ size, while
we show that the latter identifies consensus
in accordance with expert evaluations. We
then analyzed two still-contested cases and
revealed emerging (or consistent) consensus.
Since 2004, the literature on cellular phone
hazards has been consensual. Regarding the
idea that MMR vaccinations cause autism,
our analysis reveals that this issue has never
carried any scientific contestation.
While our interpretation of the results pro-
vides excellent fit with existing evaluations,
there is no single ahistorical decisive empirical
threshold between consensus and contestation.
Reifying any value to identify such a threshold
would be ill advised, as our tool requires sensi-
tivity to different citation styles, literature sizes,
and periods. The results suggest that a ratio of
.1 between raw modularity and logged network
size may provide a useful rule of thumb. But
just as blind adherence to the .05 threshold
for statistical significance leads to substantive
nonsense in interpreting relationships between
variables in extremely large datasets, judgment
is necessary here, as well, to make substan-
tively meaningful statements. In these analyses,
some consensus formation processes did not
always remain below .1. For example, scien-
tific discussion on the carcinogenicity of coffee
hovers on either side of .1 after 1985. Like
other analyses (e.g., Bhutani, Johnson, and Si-
vieri 1999), marking a threshold of .1 does not
mean that coherent literatures with scaled mod-
ularity of .09 are always consensual, and those
with .11 are always contested. One should
focus on the trend and the context more than
the number.
A quantitative measure of scientific con-
sensus reinstates a sociological niche in the
field defined by science policy analysts on
the one hand and STS scholars on the other.
We utilize different approaches. Following
Oreskes, we seek consensus in scientific in-
scriptions; following Latour and Collins, we
model consensus as black boxing and show
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that internal divisions are observable in cita-
tion networks as competing communities.
Noting the unified structural implication of
Merton’s and Latour’s theories of citations,
we offer a structural measure of real-time sci-
entific consensus, with a minimal latency
period induced mostly by journal response
time. We depart from ANT and SSK’s quali-
tative empirical orientation and subject their
insights to quantitative modeling, enabling
us to evaluate consensus within arcane scien-
tific fields.
The utility of our approach is evident
merely by considering the scope of the scien-
tific issues considered, covering a century of
research in several different disciplines. Mod-
ularity trends not only identify transition peri-
ods but also show that scientific literatures
adapt to new findings quickly. In cases previ-
ously considered by science scholars, the
quantitative trends fit the narrative reports.
Scientific findings such as modularity
never completely speak for themselves. A
new method cannot be calibrated without
external judgments. Our validation of the
analysis presented here has two potential sour-
ces of bias. The first is minor: the choice of
the IARC and the IPCC as calibration meas-
ures. Other benchmarks may exist. The sec-
ond source of bias is more challenging:
populating the dataset by analyst’s keywords
selection. As discussed earlier, this has the
advantage of defining a cognitive domain
through its substance. It is also robust across
different formulations (see the online supple-
ment), but like any method it is at risk to mal-
feasance. The deepest challenge arises from
the fact that a change in science induces
change in nomenclature. For scientific contes-
tation dynamics operating over the long term,
sensitivity to shifting keywords is critical.
Public Understanding and the
Sociology of Science
One of the many virtues of contemporary
STS and Public Understanding of Science
(PUS) studies is their attention to different
mechanisms that may limit the scope of our
strategy. Consensus may emerge if one side
of a controversy strategically changes its lan-
guage (Simon 2002), or consensus may veil
contestation by actors with no access to
peer-reviewed journals (Wynne 1996). For
PUS scholars, scrutinizing science is only
a part of scrutinizing the public engagement
with science (Nelkin 1995). Our strategy is
limited to peer-reviewed journals. It is by
no means a panacea to scrutinizers of sci-
ence. It could, however, help PUS scholars
evaluate the academic side of their story.
For example, for issues such as climate
change and smoking, where scholars argue
that a minority of hired experts created a dis-
torted view of the scientific literature, our
strategy may offer a precautionary com-
ment.15 Future studies might implement our
strategy for the blogosphere, extending it
beyond peer-reviewed papers.
Determining scientific consensus without
relying on structural tools typically required
expert knowledge. We do not aim at rendering
experts obsolete; rather, we offer a comple-
mentary strategy designed to help experts
and their audiences. In the future, our
approach could be refined, implemented in
online search engines, and used by everyone.
By allowing anyone to define a literature
and assess its dynamics quantitatively, sociol-
ogy can partake in the effort to make science
public and more democratic.
Patterns of Consensus Formation
Assessing consensus, of course, has nothing
to do with ‘‘the truth.’’ It is thus encouraging
to find that when consensus is achieved, net-
works grow exponentially. More studies are
published in peer-reviewed journals that use
the keywords attached to the recent consen-
sus. Evans (2007a) shows that discursive
consensus increases scientific production.
This anti-intuitive claim comes into clear
focus here: If consensus was obtained with
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fragile evidence, it will likely dissolve with
growing interest, which is what happened at
the onset of gravitational waves research. If
consensus holds, it opens secondary ques-
tions for scrutiny. This observation gives
rise to the three different trajectories of sci-
entific propositions—what we call flat, spi-
ral, and cyclical.
It seems trivial that some people do not
drink coffee for fear of cancer, even though
the scientific community considers coffee to
be a non-carcinogen (see Figure 4, Panel A);
the belief that MMR vaccinations cause
autism (see Figure 5, Panel B), however,
which leads some people to reject vaccination
for their children, is not trivial. Despite this
difference, both cases show no epistemic
rivalry. The world of flat science can mean
two main things. In the coffee case there is
no coherent research agenda. The coincidence
of coffee and cancer in papers is largely the
accidental byproduct of large research efforts
in cancer and coffee respectively. Contention
around the carcinogenicity of coffee does
not arise (IARC 1991), and articles cite other
articles seemingly at random. By contrast, the
scientific flatness around vaccinations and
autism is different—here science speaks with
a single voice in opposition to a lay critique.
The drive to new studies arises exogenously,
but there is no real debate. Articles that refute
the connection cite other similar articles. Here
too, as a consequence, communities of conten-
tion within science fail to arise.
The propositions that the sun causes can-
cer, people cause climate change, and mobile
phones do not cause cancer unfold in a spiral
trajectory. In spiral trajectories, initially
intense contestation generates rapid settlement
and induces a spiral of new questions to which
scientists become oriented. Here the settle-
ments of earlier contestation provide scaffold-
ing for new communities of research.
Consequently, the modularity of the founda-
tional question—do people cause climate
change, for example—remains low because
the communities of contestation organized
around secondary issues are bridged through
citation to a historically evolving core of
accepted knowledge. This spiral conforms to
our cultural ideal of science in which scien-
tists are left to their own devices. The drive
to new research arises endogenously, as if
a Kuhnian machine were operating just as it
should.
The case of smoking and cancer looks like
Abbott’s (2001) description of the social sci-
ences—a constant return to initial states.
Each reduction in contestation levels was fol-
lowed by reoccurring contestation—on the
same plane, reformulating the same issue of
public interest. In cyclic trajectories, refram-
ing requires new consensus formation, align-
ments, and goal settings. This trajectory—in
the case of smoking and cancer it was sus-
tained for years around the controversial quest
for safer cigarettes—eventually transitioned to
a spiral pattern around secondhand smoke in
the 1980s.
One further sociological insight that our
analysis emphasizes is unanticipated differen-
ces between cases—for example, between
tobacco’s carcinogenicity and climate change.
Qualitative analyses of each in tandem are
rare because of the expertise required to ana-
lyze them. The few attempts at comparison
frame both cases similarly—as cases in which
powerful groups created public doubts in oth-
erwise consensual science (Michaels 2006;
see also Proctor and Schiebinger 2008). Our
analysis, by contrast, clearly shows that the
formation of consensus took different paths:
Climate change followed a spiral trajectory,
while tobacco research was (for most of its
history) trapped in a cycle of persistent repeti-
tion. Scientific consensus in this literature was
solidified only in the late 1980s, more than
half a century after initial evidence was pub-
lished. Early consensus on tobacco’s carcino-
genicity formed in 1959 to 1964 and led to the
controversial search for a safer cigarette. Sci-
entific consensus on climate change, on the
other hand, formed in the early 1990s as evi-
dence was still being gathered. Our findings
suggest that commentators on these cases
should be aware of the different pathways
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agnotology takes. Tobacco firms directly in-
vested in scientific research (Bero 2003),
while climate change skeptics used the media
and political office holders to cultivate doubt
(Jacques, Dunlap, and Freeman 2008). Both
strategies are effective in creating contestation
—in the short run.
Our research strategy first asked the ques-
tion—are the dynamics of consensus forma-
tion the same across these hotly contested
propositions—and then answered it. Hope-
fully, development of approaches like ours
within the sociology of science will lead us
out of the cycle of persistent repetition by
identifying new problems and new answers.
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Notes
1. The distinction between benign contestation and
epistemic rivalries harkens back to Kuhn’s (1970)
distinction between normal science and periods of
crisis/revolution. Whereas Kuhn’s focus is on dif-
ferent periods, we distinguish between forms of
contestation that co-exist temporally.
2. At this time, consensus holds that smoking and solar
radiation cause cancer and that humans are causing
climate change. In Sleeper (1973), Woody Allen
wakes up in a future where the consensus is that
smoking improves health. This article is concerned
with understanding when scientific consensus is es-
tablished, not if it is true in some absolute way.
3. Merton (1957) suggests that citations are acts of
debt payment, following a market metaphor. Latour
(1987) argues that citations are rhetorical acts of
mobilization, following a military metaphor. For
current purposes, both lead to the same conclusion:
citations are more likely to signal agreement (shown
empirically in Hanney et al. 2005).
4. Of course, papers have a life of their own. For
example, while Merton never explicitly argued
that sociology of science should avoid analyzing
knowledge, his 1973 book was read in this manner,
and the string ‘‘Merton (1973)’’ was used to assert
this (Hargens 2004). Reducing knowledge to its
practitioners is not solely the vice of Mertonians.
SSK added knowledge to the study of scientists,
but they accept knowledge only as a property of
a human actor. This view prevails in contemporary
studies of expertise as Collins and Evans (2007) and
Weinel (2008) indicate.
5. Community salience is also low when papers do not
promote the same views but discuss different things
and have little to do with each other. The nature of
the data suggests that this too signals consensus.
6. While we reached this idea via Latour, it can be
framed in Kuhnian (1970) terms, as the emergence
of a paradigm, or in Lakatosian (1970) terms, that
is, in new research programs that have yet to develop
a core, auxiliary hypotheses form separate communi-
ties. When science matures, practitioners agree on
a core and community demarcations dissolve.
7. Ending a word with a * means that all characters
following the previous string are accepted. Key-
words are connected by OR within parentheses
and AND between parentheses, so that a paper
needs at least one word from each parentheses to
be included in the dataset.
8. At the 100th percentile, the network is the cumula-
tive network. At the 1st percentile, the network is
similar to a sliding window with a width of 1.
The median is akin to citation half-life, which is
not only an intuitive cutoff point but also provides
intuitive widths, usually of 3 to 6 years with outliers
of 2 and up to 11.
9. Authority is a centrality measure for directed net-
works, assigning nodes with an authority score
based on in-degree and a hub score based on out-
degree. Each score’s calculation weighs neighbors’
scores on the other measure. This calculates papers’
importance not only by their citation counts but by
considering who is citing them.
10. Initial periods of fluctuating authorities occur when
networks are very small. The slopes obtained by the
cumulative approach converge to 1 when networks
have more than 17 papers.
11. Experts’ reports are not the only mechanism for
consensus declaration, but they are the most
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authoritative and frequently used mechanism, and
the one most often cited as proof.
12. Because the IARC was founded in 1965, we also
note the first U.S. Surgeon General (1964) report
on smoking. We also note the 1992 EPA report
because of its importance (see Kabat 2008).
13. See also the online supplement.
14. Collins’s detailed review of the field starts at 1966.
We grayed out the earlier years that our data covers.
15. As one reviewer noted, if everyone used our strat-
egy it may be subjected to Goodhart’s law: inter-
ested parties who in the past needed only to hire
a well-respected scholar may attempt to publish pa-
pers and manipulate citations to create a false sense
of consensus. We should be so fortunate. The fact
that a useful measure may be manipulated in the
future provides little reason to abandon it.
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